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Moroccan Islamists Debate  
the Causes of Violent Extremism 
Jack V. Kalpakian 
Abstract 
Using Moroccan sources associated with the Islamist movement, this 
paper outlines the theological and political challenges facing Morocco in 
terms of violent extremism, especially those posed by certain Wahhabi and 
Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam. It outlines the 
state’s response to terrorism and evaluates its causes as offered by several 
Islamist Moroccan intellectuals. 
 
Keywords: violent extremism, Salafism, Wahhabism, Islamism, Morocco, 
political reform  
 
 
Introduction 
Many Moroccans believed their country to be immune to terrorist attacks after 
September 11, 2001. This belief was associated with a narrative of exceptionalism 
that held the Kingdom of Morocco to be exempt from extremism because of its 
traditionalist approach to Islam, and the relationship between the state, the 
monarchy, and Islam, as well as the prevalence of Sufi, or Islamic mystical, practice 
among vast segments of the population. However, it was precisely in this context 
that the attacks of May 16, 2003, took place in Casablanca. The country’s 
exceptional, ideational context guaranteed these small attacks an impact and 
influence far beyond their actual casualty figures, which were about 44 people, 
including about 14 attackers. For the following four years, the state played a cat-
and-mouse game against the local Al Qaeda affiliates. By April 2007 with the 
dismantling of some of the most active terrorist cells that participated in the May 
16, 2003, attacks, that conflict was resolved clearly in the favor of the state, but 
certain problems remained (Benchemsi, 2007, pp. 21-27). First, small unaffiliated 
groups and individuals continued to pose a threat. This threat was clearly displayed 
in the April 28, 2011 Argana cafe attack in Marrakesh that killed 17 people and 
injured 25 more people. Second, some Moroccans, particularly those from overseas 
and from Northern Morocco continued to join Al Qaeda and Da’esh, (the “Islamic 
state” organization), because of alienation and feelings of marginalization, and due 
to the ideological appeal of the extremists. For these reasons, the views that 
prompted the attacks continued to find currency among a minority of Moroccan 
people. The December 2018 murder by local Da’esh sympathizers of Louisa 
Vesterager Jespersen and Maren Ueland, two young Scandinavian tourists and 
hikers, caused the debates among Moroccan people at all levels surrounding 
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terrorism, religion, external influence, and the relationship with the Western world 
to be reignited. The attackers posted videos of their attacks and the state was able 
to arrest them and much of their support network. This was not surprising given that 
there are frequent arrests of terror suspects and a nearly continuous pace of cells 
being disrupted and neutralized. A recent example was the arrest of three Daesh 
sympathizers in Fez. The Director of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation, 
Mr. Abdelhak El Khiyame, claimed that his agency apprehended 2,963 suspects and 
dismantled 341 cells between 2002 and 2016 (Igrouane, 2016).  
Like any other country facing the problem of violent extremism, the Moroccan 
state has been trying to address the root causes of the attacks. For example, it created 
a development program that tried to address some of the socioeconomic grievances 
of the poorest citizens and engaged in a well-structured security campaign against 
the terrorist movements, without returning to the excesses of human rights 
violations of the past. The conventional policy of political reform, economic 
inclusion, and law enforcement worked quite well. In some ways, it helped create 
the political condition of relative deprivation, a situation where political instability 
increases despite overall economic improvements because some people are doing 
better than others. In this context, the Arab Spring arrived in Morocco in the form 
of the February 20th movement of 2011. The state's response to that movement 
included additional democratization and the election of an Islamist Democrat as the 
Government President – a position analogous to Prime Minister, since Morocco is 
a monarchy. The government’s efforts are discussed here to provide some context 
for the reader; there are more extensive assessments of these efforts by the author 
and others elsewhere. 
This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of the Moroccan struggle against 
extremism – religious debates surrounding terrorism. While religious reforms, such 
as the creation of women religious guides, requiring college level education for 
Imams and reforming the structure of religious education, have been an integral part 
of the Moroccan program against violent extremism, earlier attempts focused on 
security did not address theological questions that fed violence against Moroccan 
people, other Muslims, and non-Muslims alike when approached from a Takfiri 
(declaring other Muslims as apostates and anathemizing them as well as 
legitimating violence against them) perspective. The threat of violence coexists with 
the rejection of the State’s approach to Islam, which were the rejection of the 
religious legitimacy of the state to gain currency, the door to more violence and 
even civil war will open. This is the theological challenge that needs to be addressed 
before Morocco can transition to a society where democracy and rule of law are 
actualized within a Muslim and conservative social context. Therefore, this paper 
addresses the origin, extent, and scope of Salafi and Wahhabi thought in a Moroccan 
context with particular emphasis on its most extreme views such as those held by 
the violent wings of Takfiri Salafis. It also addresses the State’s responses to Salafis 
and Wahhabism in both historical and current settings. Nevertheless, the first and 
primary focus of this paper is the conversation that took place among self-avowed 
Moroccan Islamists concerning the origins of violent extremism. There is a vast gap 
in the literature concerning this issue, and this paper intends to bring some of these 
debates into the attention of the larger world. 
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Preliminary Considerations 
This paper deals with the political challenge posed by non-governmental, 
particularly Wahhabi and Salafi theological positions, and focuses on the political 
and security implications of these challenges for the population and government of 
Morocco (in that order), but it does not take a position concerning the accuracy or 
“correctness” of any particular set of theological positions. Questions like “is 
Wahhabism a correct interpretation of Islam?” are outside the scope of this paper. 
There are many overlapping varieties of Wahhabism and Salafism movements, and 
most of these do not preach or practice violence. The author simply invites readers 
to place themselves in the shoes of a Salafi or Wahhabi Moroccan, who often is a 
small independent businessperson struggling to earn a living. After 2003, Moroccan 
Salafis and Wahhabis found themselves under the State’s suspicion and under a 
certain level of social isolation as well. The vast majority of them do not support or 
condone violent extremism, but they nevertheless found themselves feared by many 
in the rest of the population, including, in some cases, their own relatives.  
To complicate matters, the contributions of Salafi and Wahhabi communities 
to the Moroccan economy are significant. As stated earlier, these men and women 
are often active in small business, employing themselves and others, providing 
services and products, and engaging in new investments using their own savings. 
People living in Morocco would attest that the economic contribution of Salafi 
communities is vital, and that any program that aims to deal with their violent sub-
set must avoid damaging the majority of its members and followers who do not 
condone violence. This paper looks at these beliefs only in terms of their security 
and political implications. Other people’s rights are impacted only by the actions of 
some members of these communities, not by the beliefs, however exclusionary they 
may be, of the majorities within them. Nevertheless, given that terrorists have used 
these beliefs to justify their attacks, discussing them is legitimate within the rubric 
of political studies, because they are also political beliefs, provided that the 
action/belief distinction is kept in mind. Terrorists like Al-Mailoudi have openly 
stated that their beliefs motivated their attacks (Al-Mailoudi, Fezazi, Al-Shadali, & 
Hadous, 2003, pp. 47-48). 
 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this paper, terrorism, also referred to as violent extremism, 
is political violence committed by non-state movements or persons against civilians 
with the aim of using the resulting fear to insure political and/or social change. The 
term was used by anarchist and Marxist terrorists, including those who are self-
avowed, without shame or odium in the past. One Marxist theorist and practitioner 
of terrorism took issue with the negativity attached to the term: 
 
The accusation of “violence” or “terrorism” no longer has the negative 
meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing; a new color. It does 
not divide, it does not discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of 
attraction. Today, to be “violent” or a “terrorist” is a quality that ennobles 
any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary 
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engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and 
its atrocities. (Marighella, 1969)  
 
While Marxists like Marighella subscribed to the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
and Mao, the violent segment of the Salafist movement has less clearly defined 
textual boundaries. Like Marxists however, they also tend to write prolifically about 
their reasons for carrying out the things they do. They often use theological 
arguments to justify their actions. So, Moroccan scholars, including Islamist and 
Salafi scholars, have attempted to distinguish between the various forms of Salafi 
and Wahhabi discourse. Implicitly, this paper uses a typology created by the late 
Moroccan Member of Parliament and religious scholar, Shaykh’Abd al-Barri Al-
Zamzami. There are certain advantages to using a typology derived from Moroccan 
political life, because it is sensitive to the local context. Due to his interest in Islamic 
mores governing sexuality, Al-Zamzami was controversial in his lifetime and 
attracted both ridicule and praise from Moroccan social liberals and Salafis alike. 
Nevertheless, his typology, while clearly designed to uphold his own version of 
Salafism, can be very useful in navigating Moroccan perspectives of their Salafi 
and Wahhabi communities. He participated in the intellectual life of the country, 
making presentations in parliament and at scholarly conferences, so his eccentricity 
should not disqualify him from inclusion in this analysis.  
Al-Zamzami blames the Gulf States for the spread of types of Salafism that he 
finds negative in Morocco. However, matters are more complex, as this paper shows 
in subsequent sections. He clearly exonerates Moroccan forms of Salafism, such as 
his own and those of ‘Allal Al-Fasi, who campaigned for an independent Morocco 
and helped found the current political system, where liberalism influences what is 
essentially an Islamic kingdom (Howe, 2005). For Salafis and other Islamists, 
controversy over what constitutes both “true” Salafism and the “correct” application 
of the thoughts of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is unavoidable. The table below summarizes 
and gives a formal structure to Al-Zamzami’s thoughts on problematic forms 
Salafism in Morocco. It will be addressed in more detail in the section on 
theological challenges. 
In the view of this author, a social scientist cannot take a stance on these 
questions since these questions are outside the scope of social sciences and properly 
belong to Islamic Theology. Nevertheless, it is possible to look at violence, which 
is a form of political actions, so the focus here is on actions rather than on beliefs. 
Beliefs, as claimed by the terrorists themselves, only become a topic of study here 
when they are acted upon. Consequently, the object of study here is the Jihadi 
Salafism with its complete focus on violence, terrorism, and war upon all non-
believers, including other Muslims and its security implications.  
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Table 1 
Al-Zamzami’s Typology of “Incorrect” Forms of Salafism in Morocco 
 
Type Characteristics Doctrine 
Arabian 
Gulf-style 
Wahhabi 
Salafism 
NGO-level 
institutionalization, “Quranic 
houses,” and private and 
public financial support from 
the GCC states. 
Represents an extension of Gulf 
approaches to Wahhabism in a 
Moroccan context. Differs from 
traditional and historic 
Moroccan approaches to 
Wahhabism. 
Popular 
Salafism 
An emphasis on appearances 
and the superficial 
characteristics of the 
movement, for example 
being bearded and insisting 
on the headscarf. 
No textual references. It relies 
on adherence to satellite TV 
preachers.  
Jihadi 
Salafism 
A complete focus on 
violence, terrorism and war 
upon all non-believers, 
including other Muslims. 
The ideas of Osama bin Laden 
and those who inspired him, 
including Abu al-Alaa Al-
Mawdudi. 
Isolationist 
Takfiri 
Salafism 
Rejection of the rest of 
society as pagan and self-
isolating, restricting social 
and personal relations to the 
“saved” community only. 
Strict focus on Wahhabi 
foundational texts such as those 
written by Ibn Qaim Al-
Jouyaza.  
Source: Al-Zamzami, A. (2006). Salafism and Terrorism. Casablanca, Morocco: 
Al-Najah, al-Jadida, and Sunnah Publications, pp. 13-16. 
 
Yet Al-Zamzami has to be placed in a global context. “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” 
are terms that have been confused and conflated. There is ideological overlap 
between the two movements, and they are often confused, precisely because their 
extremist wings tend to overlap and function as one. As with the rest of the world, 
Moroccan Salafis represent a broader movement than the specific Wahhabi 
movement which originated in what is now known as Saudi Arabia in the 18th 
century. A Salafi is a Muslim who adheres to the path of the pious predecessors (al-
Salaf al-Salih), in contrast to those who adhere to al-Khalaf al-Falih (the productive 
successors). The term has seen multiple uses over the generations, with people as 
diverse as Melcom Khan of Iran, and Mohmmed Abduh and Abu al-‘Alaa al-
Mawdudi of Pakistan being labeled Salafis. In the Moroccan context, the ideology 
of Al-Fasi has been described as Salafi-inspired, because it postulated that Morocco 
must be a Muslim rather than a secular state. The term is consequently fluid and 
needs proper contextualization both in terms of time and place. Al-Zamzami is 
essentially saying that there are correct versions of Salafism and Wahhabism and 
these tended to be the earlier forms in Morocco; consequently, his typology allows 
us to see some of the diversity in the Moroccan Salafi and Wahhabi movements. As 
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for Wahhabism, it is a simpler term, because it refers to its founder, Mohammed 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an 18th century religious reformer and political activist aligned 
with the dynasty that came to rule Saudi Arabia. Like many other Salafis, he 
followed the Hanbali tradition of jurisprudence. It is his work, particularly his 
reading of Ibn Tammiya, and that of his students that forms the textual basis of what 
became Wahhabism. Wahhabism relies on asserting that the precedent of Ibn 
Tammiya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is pious, and consequently, it is a Salafi 
movement. There are non-Wahhabi Salafists, and the two terms are not 
interchangeable, despite considerable overlap (Bin Ali & Bin Sudiman, 2016).  
 
Normative Considerations 
Given the topic, there is also no escape from normative considerations, and this 
paper is no exception. This analysis stands with violent extremism’s civilian victims 
first. It also stands with people who face ostracism for their religious views despite 
not advocating or practicing violence. To that end, this paper uses a combination of 
history, participant observation, and perspectives of Moroccan leaders as a basis for 
outlining the theological challenge in a Moroccan context. To do so, it outlines the 
overall Moroccan counter-extremism effort, details the history of Moroccan Salafi 
and Wahhabi movements in the country, and summarizes the overall Moroccan 
policy response in the religious field, particularly the theological response of the 
State. Since these items are ultimately reflected in government policies, the overall 
approach is influenced by elements of policy evaluation methods. In this case, the 
ultimate measure of success is a decline in the performance of terrorist outfits within 
the country. Finally, this paper takes what terrorists say about their motives 
seriously. Like their Marxist and Anarchist forerunners, Al Qaeda, Da’esh and their 
supporters have been vocal both in print and in public statements about their 
motives. Taking them seriously, understanding their points of reference, and 
responding to them must be part and parcel of any policy designed to reduce 
violence. 
 
Attempts at Social and Economic Reforms 
Economic improvement is a vital action for governments to take in response to 
violent extremism. Poverty creates an environment that, directly or indirectly, 
enables violent extremism to grow. On the eve of the May 16, 2003 attacks, the 
Moroccan economy languished far behind that of Southern Europe and 
unemployment was rife. The tourism sector did not have its current dynamism and 
access to and from the country was very expensive. The largest sector in terms of 
employment was and remains agriculture and most people still resided in the 
countryside when the attacks took place. While Morocco still lags behind Southern 
and Eastern Europe, the per capita gross national product on a purchasing power 
parity basis (per capita GDP/PPP) rose from 3985 USD in 2002 to 7841 USD in 
2015 (World Bank, 2011). 
These improvements owed a lot to monetary stability, wherein the Moroccan 
dirham is tied to a basket of currencies dominated by the Euro, while trading in a 
controlled market. Other factors that assisted economic growth have been 
government encouragement of manufacturing, especially of automobiles and 
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aircraft parts for export. The call center industry, specializing in providing services 
in French and Spanish, was an early success. The economy now suffers from a 
paradox of a labor shortage combined with unemployment, which is a better 
dilemma than unemployment alone. The problem is increasingly refusal of urban 
youth to participate in the workforce due to perceptions of low wages when 
compared to the same professions in Europe, and a simpler problem – the lack of 
qualified individuals. Despite the obvious and clear improvement of the overall 
economy, Morocco still needs a rather generous welfare and development policy 
because poverty remains dire and widespread. Poverty complicates the 
government’s counter-extremism efforts. The government’s National Initiative for 
Human Development (INDH in its French abbreviation), whose first phase ran over 
a five-year period until 2010, appeared after the attacks. The initiative was partially 
motivated by a desire to reduce the appeal of violent extremism, which in Morocco 
takes a religio-political form, but it was also a studied response to a rather dire 
situation. The program's first phase cost about 1.2 billion U.S. Dollars over its five-
year life. However, the Initiative struggled especially in its attempts to impact rural 
livelihoods: 
 
At the launch of the operation (2005), Morocco suffered from high levels 
of poverty (14.2%, with a further 23% ‘economically vulnerable’), 
strikingly poor income inequality, and low human development indicators. 
Over half of adults were illiterate, compared to an average of 10% for 
lower middle-income countries. Poverty was equally pronounced in both 
rural and urban areas, albeit with different characteristics. Although half 
of public expenditures were allocated to the social sectors, access and 
quality were limited, particularly for rural people because of the centrally 
driven approach, with low levels of participation, weak coordination 
amongst line ministries, and inadequate targeting. (World Bank, 2013) 
 
The growing pains of the program marked the first phase. The country had to 
confront a wide variety of social issues head on with few resources. The second 
phase saw the construction of new highways, high speed rail, and solar and wind 
power plants. The program is now in its third phase, as new facilities are being 
opened by the King under its own title and structure (Nafaa, 2017), and was referred 
to as a priority by the current Minister of Finance (Le360Live, 2017). Assessing the 
program’s impact is outside the scope of this paper. The INDH program began after 
the May 16, 2003, attacks. 
 
Political Reforms 
The early reaction to the May 16th attacks, initially included the continuation 
of the alternation policy with the elected parliament and State, wherein the monarch 
shared power with an elected prime minister elected by the majority coalition in 
parliament. By 2007, a conservative, Istiqlal Party-led, government chose a set of 
policies that many Moroccans found restrictive. By that same year, Al Qaedas 
sound defeat in Morocco had become apparent, and the more conservative political 
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forces with Moroccan society and government felt that the threat had waned. Istiqlal 
is a conservative, nationalist party that led the country to independence; its ideology 
reflects the thinking of Al-Fassi and emphasizes the Islamic nature of Morocco. 
Historically, it endorsed the Arabization of Morocco and the abandonment of 
Tamazight. Therefore, the pace of political reforms that began under the alternation 
governments in the late 1990s slowed and in some cases reversed. “Alteration” was 
a power-sharing agreement between Hasan II and the Socialist opposition. The post 
of prime minister alternated between a monarchist prime minister and the socialist 
opposition. The real or perceived decline in freedoms during 2007-2011 set the 
stage for the Arab Spring in Morocco. The Moroccan Arab Spring took the form of 
a non-violent youth protest movement named after the day it was launched on 
February 20, 2011. The movement was supported by the youth wings of nearly all 
mainstream Moroccan political parties. It had the support of well-known and well-
connected businesspeople like Karim Tazi and the late Miloud Chaabi (Mekouar, 
2016). 
In response to the February 20th Movement, the king offered reform. These 
measures included a referendum on a new constitution, more powers shifted to the 
parliament, and the replacement of the Prime Minister's office with a newly elected 
government president, a title borrowed from Spanish practice, akin to the term 
“Minister-President” used in Germany and Belgium. The ensuing elections saw the 
emergence of the Islamist-democratic Justice and Development Party (PJD) as the 
leading partner in the government coalition. The party performed well in office and 
secured re-election, but the parliamentary dynamics prevented the re-election of its 
leader ’Abdel-Ilah Benkirane as government president. While there has been noted 
progress towards democracy in Morocco, the present situation falls short of the 
reform vision outlined by the king on March 9, 2011 (Mohammed VI, 2011). In 
part, the shortcomings were due to the fear expressed by the political parties and the 
political class over issues related to Moroccan identity, including religion. The 
political debates on Moroccan religious identity necessarily included the Islamist 
Party of Justice and Development, which won the two following elections. 
 
Religious Reforms 
While the political, economic, and policy reforms can be said to reduce the 
risks of violence, the root cause of terrorism in Morocco lies in issues connected 
with certain extremist interpretations of religion first and foremost. It has been 
argued by Sa’id Al-Kahal, a leftist secular Moroccan thinker, that there is no 
economic or political reason for the violence. By pointing to the attackers’ own 
statements, Al-Kahal argues that the attackers’ reasons are primarily eschatological. 
He highlights a statement made in court to a judge by Mohamed Damir, a suspect 
connected to the May 16th attacks who viewed his actions as ones that would find 
favor on the final day by God:  
 
I would like to surround you with the knowledge that I committed 
the actions of which I am accused; I committed them and did them 
upon the knowledge of the book of God and the sunnah of his 
prophet … I am happy … because I [am] being tried for 
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commanding the good and prohibiting that which is forbidden. 
(Al-Kahal, 2008, p. 271) 
 
Damir clearly articulated the challenge to the state posed by his particular strand of 
the Salafi movement, and to its credit, the government has been trying to institute 
reforms to address the ideological challenge it faces. To start, it began reasserting 
its monopoly on the religious sphere. After the April 2007 attacks, the state shut 
down “Qu’ranic Houses” controlled by Mohammed ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-
Maghraoui. Al-Maghraoui is known for enjoining the marriage of nine-year old 
girls in a well-known fatwa he had issued online (Hemimat, 2009, pp. 103-111). 
Today, the state requires aspiring imams to possess a bachelor's degree with at least 
the equivalent of a “B” average, have knowledge of foreign languages, and undergo 
additional instruction on special topics such as Social Psychology. The Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs also reformed the curriculum on clerical seminaries and female 
religious counselors. Theses counselors, or Murshidat in the Arabic plural, were the 
first such step ever undertaken in the Islamic world (Ministry of Religious 
Foundations and Islamic Affairs, 2006).  
 
The Theological Challenge 
As Al-Zamzami (2006) argued, there are Moroccan versions of Salafism, 
which include elements of Wahhabism in their approach to the religion. While the 
state is Maliki (based on the Sunni school established by Imam Malik Ibn Anas, 
who emphasized the precedents set in Medina by the Prophet of Islam and the 
people of the city or as he called it “the work of the people of Medina”) in 
jurisprudence, Asha’ari (following the ideas of Asha’ari who emphasized the need 
for context and discussion while arguing that some things need to be accepted on 
faith) in doctrine, and Sufi (mystical and directly relational to God through mystical 
practice) in foundation, it has had a long history of interaction with the Wahhabi 
movement from its inception onwards (Ministry of Religious Foundations and 
Islamic Affairs, 2017). It is important to note that the Muslim world does not view 
its own divisions in the same manner of denominational differences within Buddhist 
and Christian traditions. Informal and less structured influence has been ongoing 
since the 18th century, when Wahhabism emerged. Wahhabism's influence in 
Morocco is so significant that a book, Wahhabism: the Founder, the Thought and 
the Movement (Belkabir, 2004) written by some of the country’s leading luminaries, 
was prepared in its defense in an attempt to de-link it from the attacks that took 
place only six weeks prior. The manuscript went to the printer the following year 
and is a valuable insight on how Wahhabism is understood by the country’s 
intellectual elite. The book attempts to defend Wahhabism as a well-meaning, if 
largely unsuccessful, reform movement. It contains a speech by the Sultan Slimane 
(1766-1822, reigning from 1792 until his death) attacking certain folk practices 
such as festivals and shrine visits. One article underscores the connection between 
Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, Moulay Slimane’s grandfather, who was a 
contemporary and a supporter of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Professor Abdelhadi 
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Boutaleb (deceased in 2009), a senior Moroccan scholar and a diplomat, recognizes 
the historical roots of the Moroccan Wahhabi movement in the book: 
 
Sultan Mohamed ibn Abdullah led an important reform movement. He 
focused his attention on the science of hadith, which is the source of the 
Salafi movement since the time of Ahmed ibn Hanbal and Ibn Tammiya. 
He introduced Morocco to the foundations of Imam Ahmed [sic Ibn 
Hanbal] and the foundations of Ibn Hanifa, which were not known in 
Morocco … He was a true Salafi, who described himself as Maliki in 
jurisprudential orientation and Hanbali in belief. He forbade the reading of 
books based on kalam [sic “dialogue” meaning philosophical debate] 
along Ash’arite lines, and enjoined stopping at beliefs taking from the 
apparent meaning of the book and the Sunnah without interpretation in the 
Salafi way. (Boutaleb, 2004, p.142) 
 
Boutaleb is recalling a very different Salafism and a very different Wahhabism that 
existed in Morocco’s past. Not only that, the peaceful life exemplified by Boutaleb 
and other academic admirers of Wahhabism stands in sharp contrast to the lifestyles 
enjoined and pursued by the terrorists. Having served as the Moroccan ambassador 
to the United States, Boutaleb’s political and personal philosophy was clearly 
realistic and pragmatic. Like other authors in the book, he appears to think that 
Wahhabism can be a progressive force. The authors go as far as to invoke the late 
Mohamed ‘Abed Al-Jabri, a professor of philosophy and Islamic thought at 
Mohammed V University and a quasi-secular thinker (deceased 2010) criticized for 
his free thought by Salafis (Al-Hababi, 2004, p. 160).  
The pragmatic and rationalistic ideas of Boutaleb concerning Wahhabism are 
not shared by Takfiri Salafists (see table on page 4) who would condemn him for 
consorting and interacting with pagans (the Americans) during his stint as 
ambassador in the United States. The Wahhabi movement has been characterized 
by excess and over-politicization, according to a leading Salafi figure, Farid Al-
Ansari (2007). An often misunderstood and underestimated theologian, Al-Ansari 
was a social activist in the Unification and Reform Movement (Tawhid wa Islah). 
This was the social movement underpinning the Moroccan Party of Justice and 
Development. One of his works directly relates to politics and his concerns about 
the Islamist movement in Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007). Al-Ansari clearly states that 
the Moroccan Islamist movement in general has been too harsh against Maliki 
Islam, Moroccan Sufism, and the use of non-Hanbali (Hanbalism is the Sunni 
school established by Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, emphasizing the literal application of the 
Qu’ran, within which Wahhabism arose) references to the point of anathematization 
or takfir. Al-Ansari (2007) calls out the Islamist movement for creating six “idols,” 
to include, “the idolization of the Hanbali denomination in the Salafi movement.” 
Concerning this final idol, Al-Ansari hones an internal critique of his own 
movement. First, Al-Ansari argues that the attacks on Maliki Islam, under a new 
generation of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars in Morocco have alienated both the state 
and many other Moroccans. Second, he argues that their insistence on ideological 
purity has harmed their community by fomenting internal divisions. Third, he 
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argues that the movement’s attacks on Sufism have earned it the hostility of Sufi 
orders in Morocco and their suspicion. Fourth, he argued the movement emphasized 
external appearances of piety instead of a values framework. Fifth, he argued that 
the form actually advocated by the Salafi and Wahhabi movement is basically what 
is practiced in the Gulf States (which he does not mention by name), and that it is a 
form alien to the needs and historical heritage of Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007, pp. 
141-175). In short, Al-Ansari forcefully argues that the Moroccan Wahhabi and 
Salafist movement is founded on a rejection, a nearly complete one, of Moroccan 
traditional approaches to religion. The rejection includes earlier versions of 
Salafism that were brought by Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, his grandson Sultan 
Slimane, independence leader ‘Allal Al-Fasi, as well as followers of the current 
movement in Morocco. Since the Moroccan constitution and tradition establish the 
monarch as the commander of the faithful in Morocco, and Islam as the official 
religion, the theological and political challenge posed by the more extreme and 
violent Wahhabi and Salafist Islamist movements is serious, because it leaves no 
room for compromise.  
This challenge is based on specific readings and interpretations of religious 
texts. As these can be classified, they are the closest item that can exist to a “cause” 
for violent extremism in a Moroccan context. Such causes were outlined by Abu 
Zaid Al-Maqari al-Idrissi (2010), a PJD member of parliament, a linguist, and a 
researcher in Islamic thought. In essence, he complements and elaborates upon the 
criticisms raised by Al-Ansari. He outlines five broad levels of causation for 
terrorism: these are cultural, psychological, mental, militant, and political. In terms 
of what he calls a cultural set of causes, he also identifies five important factors that 
lead people to become extremists. The first one is simply not having the tools to 
understand what the Qu’ran means. The second one is the detachment of written 
word from its context, including the Qu’ranic verses related to war. The third factor 
involves the mixing of missionary work with governance, failing to understand the 
difference between the two stages. Fourth, the confusion of what God appears to 
promise non-believers with what believers ought to do to them. The fifth factor 
involves mixing “right and wrong” in terms of interacting with other cultures, 
movements, and sects. Like Al-Kahal, Al-Zamzami and implicitly Al-Ansari, Al-
Maqari al-Idrissi places the cause of violent extremism first and foremost in 
ideology. On the psychological level, he identifies a psychology of oppression and 
despair that invites retaliation against the other; he points out that the traditional 
distinctions between individuals and their nation-states has broken down in people’s 
minds. At the mental level, he puts blame on media in general for making Islam 
appear more militant and violent than other religions, which has two effects: it feeds 
Islamophobia and simultaneously encourages violence. At the militant level, he 
argues that many people believe that military might is the proof that can show the 
correctness of the Islamic message and therefore warring against other populations 
is warranted. Finally, at the political level, he argues that there are grievances, such 
as Palestine, held by Muslims that feed extremism (Al-Maqari al-Idrissi, 2010, pp. 
62-72).  
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The Role of Education and Dialogue 
While security and law enforcement measures are important, they cannot stop 
terrorism without the help of society/government in addressing the underlying 
threats that extreme Salafi Jihadi interpretations of Islam pose to the Moroccan state 
and its citizens. As stated earlier, it is important to avoid the pitfall of putting the 
Salafi movement in Morocco into a single category. The clear majority of Salafis 
and Wahhabis do not practice or preach violence. A royal declaration, or dahir, was 
issued in 2016 calling for reforming the religious education system in Morocco to 
emphasize the values of peaceful co-existence, moderation, and tolerance with other 
cultures, civilizations, and religions. The declaration set off a debate on how to 
reform religious education, as well as debates between those advocating “Islamic” 
education against those advocating “comparative religious studies.” Nevertheless, 
the king’s declaration was responding to the need to reduce the threats posed by the 
violent Jihadi minority branches of the Salafi movement (Al-Kafi, 2016, pp. 3-6). 
The strategy used the educational system to recruit members and spread counter-
narratives (Benhamza, 2016, pp. 7-16). 
Educational changes may help reduce the threat in the future, but they can do 
little to persuade convinced terrorists that they should give up their planned 
violence. Therefore, the government also pursued arrests which led to interactions 
that inevitably took place between the accused terrorists and the various officials in 
the Moroccan legal system. Subsequent dialogue in the courts resulted in requests 
for royal pardons, implying that the convicted terrorist accepts the legitimacy of the 
Moroccan state. This was the case with several Salafi clerics who had given 
sermons to the attackers but expressed reservations and retractions in prison. A 
more formal process took place where the head of the official Moroccan ‘Ulema 
Association, Ahmed ‘Abadi, met with a group of 12 convicted terrorists that were 
guided by the May 16th leader, Khalid Hadad. The dialogue included such topics 
as the Maliki school of jurisprudence, the Command of the Faithful (the Moroccan 
king’s religious role), and issues related to dealing with non-Muslims. Based on 
recent reports, it appears that some of these prisoners are changing their minds out 
of conviction and not convenience (Abu al-Ma’ali, 2017). 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the complex and multifaceted Moroccan response to the challenge 
posed by the terrorists and their ideology has been effective. It may be useful to ask 
what other countries can do for Morocco, but there is little that outsiders can do. 
Nevertheless, there are things that are actionable for foreign states and actors in 
terms of reducing the level of threat both within Morocco and outside it. These 
actions may not be politically popular or economically cheap, but they are doable. 
These include enhanced levels of aid and investment in Morocco as well as a more 
cautious approach to Salafi movements than the one exhibited by the West in the 
Middle East and Syria. Aside from not creating violence in places like Libya and 
Syria, providing help to countries like Morocco also means accepting that these 
states are a product of a very different political and religious history. Other areas of 
cooperation would include security sector reform and educational improvement. 
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Ultimately, however, the theological challenge represented by the extremist 
segments of the Salafi movement can be met only by the ideological resources of 
the local states and governments in question and the religious establishments they 
support. The good news concerning the challenge posed by violent extremists is 
that the Islamist movement itself is taking them seriously and is taking apart their 
arguments. No less a Salafi thinker than the late Farid Al-Ansari has criticized the 
tendency to exclude, demonize, and condemn other people, and the whole 
mainstream of Islamist community is engaged in a debate concerning their origins 
and what to do about violent extremism, and that is a far cry from the denial that 
met the attacks on both May 16, 2003, and on 9/11.  
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